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Standing Alone?: The Michigan Supreme
Court, the Lansing Decision, and the
Liberalization of the Standing Doctrine
Kenneth Charette*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Standing refers to a litigant's ability to bring a specific cause of
action before a court.' A litigant's failure to demonstrate the necessary
requirements of standing to sue will result in a dismissal of his or her
claim.2 Standing is a judicially created doctrine designed to limit the
jurisdictional reach of courts.3 The basic premise behind the standing
doctrine is that courts should only have the power to adjudicate certain
types of claims.4 Article III of the United States Constitution limits the
power of Federal Courts to deciding only "case" or "controversy." 5 This
doctrine generally is justified on the basis of maintaining the separation
of powers between the various branches of government.6 While state
governments are not necessarily bound by the requirements of Article III,
all state courts have recognized the need for some form of a standing
doctrine.7
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2012.
1. Detroit Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 537 N.W.2d 436, 438 (Mich.
1995).
2. See id. See also Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
3. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 684 N. W2d 800 (Mich.
2004).
4. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992) (stating that
federal courts only have the power to decide a "case" and "controversy").
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
6. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (stating that standing is a
"[p]rinciple that prevents courts of law from undertaking tasks assigned to the political
branches. It is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants, in individual or class
actions, who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm; it is not the role of
courts, but that of the political branches, to shape the institutions of government in such
fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution"). See also Raines v. Byrd, 521
U.S. 811, 818, 820 (1997) (stating that standing is "built on a single basic idea-the idea
of separation of powers").
7. See, e.g., Lee v. Macomb Co. Bd. of Comm'rs, 629 N.W.2d 900, 905 (Mich.
2001) (stating that, in Michigan, "standing is of great consequence so that neglect of it
would imperil the constitutional architecture whereby governmental powers are divided
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This Comment will address the ways in which a recent Michigan
Supreme Court case dramatically altered the requirements for standing to
sue in Michigan. The Michigan Supreme Court recently handed down its
opinion in Lansing Schools EducationalAssociation v. Lansing Board of
Education.8 In Lansing, students allegedly assaulted four high school
teachers. 9 An applicable state statute required the expulsion of any
student who assaults a teacher.10 However, the school board, in its
discretion, chose only to suspend the students, as opposed to rigidly
adhering to the statutory requirements." The teachers union, on behalf
of the four teachers, filed suit seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the
local school board to expel the students.' 2 The trial court and the
appellate division dismissed the suit on the ground that the teacher union
lacked standing to sue for the enforcement of the statute under the
applicable test.13 The Michigan Supreme Court reversed and chose to
abandon the federal test for standing on the grounds that it departed too
dramatically from Michigan's historical precedents and because the
Michigan Constitution lacks an explicit "case" or "controversy"
requirement.14 The court held that a plaintiff in Michigan now has
standing to sue if either 1) he has a specific legal cause of action; or 2) a
trial court, in its discretion, believes a litigant should have standing.' 5
This Comment will focus on the ways in which the Lansing
decision alters the standing doctrine in Michigan. Section II of this
Comment will engage in a brief discussion of the historical development
of the standing doctrine in Michigan. This section provides the reader
with the necessary background to understand both the ways in which the
Lansing decision changes the requirements for standing and the court's
reasons for doing so.
Section III of this Comment will begin by discussing the Lansing
case in detail and examining the rationale behind abandoning the
previously established test for standing. This section will explore why
the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the jurisdictional reach of
Michigan courts is not limited to adjudicating only "case" or
between the three branches of government").
8. Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686 (Mich.
2010).
9. Id. at 689.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. The established test for standing in Michigan had been the same as the
Federal standard outlined by the US Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding that the test for standing was: 1) injury in fact;
2) causation; and 3) redressability).
14. Id. at 699.
15. Id.

STANDING ALONE?

2011]

201

"controversy." This section also will analyze the reasons why the court
settled on a more liberal, prudential approach to standing.
Section III of this Comment then will engage in a multijurisdictional analysis comparing the new Michigan test for standing to
the doctrinal requirements recognized by other states. This section will
analyze how other states, whose constitutions also lack an explicit "case"
or "controversy" requirement, have addressed the issue of standing to
sue. This section will demonstrate that the Lansing decision represents a
minority trend among states, rejecting the rigid requirements of the
federal test for standing in favor of a more relaxed prudential approach to
applying the doctrine.
This Comment concludes by suggesting that the new standing
doctrine articulated by the Lansing court will have a variety of negative
consequences. First, this section will argue that the new doctrine will
create judicial confusion over the necessary requirements for standing to
sue because it lacks a straightforward and easily applicable test. Second,
because the new test for standing is less restrictive, a variety of new
claims, such as challenges to environmental policy, now will be able to
survive a standing inquiry. Finally, the Lansing decision will also likely
impair the separation of powers because Michigan courts will be asked to
review the actions of the other branches of government. Consequently,
the principal conclusion of this Comment is that by adopting a new test
for standing, the Lansing court inadvertently opened Michigan courts up
to an array of problematic litigation. The Michigan Supreme Court
created a vague test which places too much discretionary power in the
hands of individual trial judges. Accordingly, this new prudential
approach to standing will result in judicial confusion, a rise in litigation,
and a breakdown of the separation of powers.
II.

BACKGROUND

In order to understand the significance of the Lansing decision, it is
important to first discuss the evolution of the standing doctrine in
Michigan. The Michigan Constitution, unlike the Federal Constitution,
does not contain an explicit "case" or "controversy" clause from which
to derive the limits of state judicial power.' 7 As a result, Michigan courts
16. See House Speaker v. Governor, 495 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Mich. 1993) (providing
an example of a "prudential" approach to the standing doctrine when the court held that a
plaintiff must plead sufficient facts in order to establish that he or she has a "substantial
interest" in the outcome of the litigation).
17. See Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 693-94
(Mich. 2010) (stating that "unlike the Michigan Constitution, however, the federal
constitution enumerates the cases and controversies to which the judicial power extends,
and the federal standing doctrine is largely derived from this art III case-or-controversy
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have struggled to define the structure of state judicial power for over a
century.18
The earliest discussions on the limits of state judicial power in
Michigan date back to the mid to late 1800s. 19 During this period,
Michigan courts, while not directly speaking to the standing issue,
seemed to approach the concept of justiciability in a manner similar to
that taken more recently by federal courts. 2 0 These cases, like some
more recent federal cases, discussed jurisdictional limits in terms of the
ability to decide only a "case" or "controversy."2 1 Moreover, courts
considered it necessary to limit judicial power in this way in order to
22
For example, Michigan Supreme
protect the separation of powers.
Court Justice Thomas Cooley reasoned that "it is the province of judicial
power to decide private disputes between or concerning persons; but of
the legislative power to regulate public concerns, and to make law for the
benefit of society." 23
Thus, Justice Cooley argued that limiting the jurisdiction of courts
to deciding only a "case" or "controversy" was essential to ensuring that
the judiciary did not encroach upon the powers delineated to the other
branches of government. 2 4 Without this requirement, courts could be
asked to adjudicate political questions which were better left to the
legislature. 2 5 Furthermore, during this early era of Michigan standing
jurisprudence, courts were also reluctant to decide a case unless a judicial

requirement").
18. See id. at 734 (Corrigan, J. dissenting) (noting that prior to the adoption of the
federal test, Michigan's standing jurisprudence was marked by confusion and
inconsistency).
19. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Governor, 29 Mich. 320, 324 (1874) (discussing the
limits of judicial power in the context of a writ of mandamus claim and stating that "[o]ur
government is one whose powers have been carefully apportioned between three distinct
departments ... and the very apportionment of power to one department is understood to
be a prohibition of its exercise by either of the others").
20. See, e.g., Daniels v. People, 6 Mich. 381 (1859).
21. See, e.g., id. at 388(defining judicial power as the power "to hear and determine
controversies between adverse parties"); Risser v. Hoyt, 53 Mich. 185, 193 (Mich. 1884)
(stating that Michigan Courts have the authority to "hear and decide controversies"). Cf
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (U.S. 1992) (stating that federal courts
only have the power to decide "cases" and "controversies").
22.

See THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATY ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 92 (Little,

Brown, & Co.) (1886).
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 684 N.W.2d 800,805-07
(Mich. 2004) (arguing that it has been historically understood that the framers of the
Michigan Constitution, by providing for the separation of powers, inherently limited the
jurisdiction of Michigan courts to deciding only "cases" or "controversies" in order to
ensure that the judicial branch would not encroach on the provinces of the other branches
of government).
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decision could provide a party with some form of adequate redress.26
Therefore, while this era did not specifically advocate for any type of
concrete standing doctrine, it was concerned more generally with
limiting the jurisdictional reach of courts. In other words, it was
generally understood that it was the province of the courts to decide only
a legitimate "case". or "controversy" to which a decision rendered by a
court would provide the appropriate redress.27
A plaintiffs standing to bring a cause of action originally became
an issue in Michigan in response to claims in which a party was seeking
a writ of mandamus to compel a public official to perform a statutory
duty28 or to enforce a public right.2 9 In response to writ of mandamus
cases, Michigan courts began to develop some prudential limitations on a
claimant's access to the court system. 3 0 These loosely defined prudential
considerations essentially left open the question of whether a standing
analysis is required by the Michigan Constitution or is rather a selfimposed discretionary tool employed by courts to limit justiciability.
Thus, standing to sue for a writ of mandamus was initially seen as a selfimposed form of judicial restraint designed to guard against generalized
grievances.
26. See Street R. Co. v. Wildman, 58 Mich. 286 (Mich. 1885) (refusing to decide a
case because injunctive relief was not available to "prevent [the defendant] from doing
what has already been done").
27. See Anway v. Grand Rapids R. Co., 179 N.W. 350, 357, 360 (Mich. 1920)
stating that:
courts of judicature are organized only to decide real controversies between
actual litigants. When, therefore, it appears, no matter how nor at what stage,
that a pretended action is not a genuine litigation over a contested right between
opposing parties . . . the court, from a sense of its own dignity, as well as from
regard to the public interests, will decline a determination of the fabricated case
so fraudulently imposed upon it.
The court went on to note that the court has historically "declined to consider abstract
questions of law and . . . to decide [cases] where our conclusions could not be made
effective by final judgment, decree, and process"). Id.
28. See, e.g., People ex rel. Drake v. Univ. of Mich. Regents, 4 Mich. 98 (Mich.
1856) (refusing to grant a writ of mandamus because the moving party could not show
that any individual or class of persons suffered an injury).
29. See Home Tel. Co. v. Michigan R Comm., 140 N. W. 496, 497-99 (Mich. 1913)
(holding that a private citizen did not have standing to enforce a public right because the
statute only conferred standing on the Attorney General).
30. See People ex rel. Ayres v. Bd. of State Auditors, 42 Mich. 422, 429 (Mich.
1880) (stating that a standing analysis was a discretionary tool used by the courts); People
ex rel. Drake v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 4 Mich. 98, 102-04 (Mich. 1856) (noting that
in order to have standing to bring a writ of mandamus claim, a plaintiff must be able to
assert a special injury or interest different from that of the general public).
31. See Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 690
(Mich. 2010) (noting that, in Michigan, "[h]istorically, the standing doctrine grew out of
cases where parties were seeking writs of mandamus to compel a public officer to
perform a statutory duty").
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Discussions of the standing doctrine become much more frequent in
Michigan's modem jurisprudence.3 2 The court focused the standing
inquiry on the question of whether a claimant possessed a substantial
"interest" in the outcome of a case. 33 In one of the most recent cases
prior to the adoption of the federal test for standing, the Michigan
Supreme Court defined standing as a type of judicial self-governance
"used to denote the existence of a party's interest in the outcome of the
litigation that will ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy."3 4 The court
further noted that "standing requires a demonstration that the plaintiffs
substantial interest will be detrimentally affected in a manner different
from the citizenry at large."05 In other words, during this era, courts did
not discuss standing in terms of it being a constitutionally mandated
doctrine. Instead, the courts developed prudential concerns designed to
weed out meritless cases by asking that a claimant be able to plead
sufficient facts to establish some type of unique injury, interest, or cause
of action.3 6
However, this prudential standing approach proved difficult to
administer because the court demonstrated an inability to agree on a clear
test for standing. 37 Consequently, in the years immediately preceding the
Lansing decision, the Michigan Supreme Court decided to adopt the
Federal test for standing in Lee v. Macomb County Board of
Commissioners.38 The Michigan Supreme Court reasoned that standing
to sue was constitutionally mandated by the Michigan Constitution and
that the federal test correctly articulated the minimum requirements to
bring a cause of action. 39 The Michigan Supreme Court further
elaborated on the importance of this test when it held that the legislature
lacked the authority to statutorily confer standing on anyone who would
otherwise not satisfy the requirements of the Lee/Lujan test.4 0 Therefore,
the Lee decision shifted the issue of standing in Michigan from a general
set of principles that gave the courts a great amount of discretion to a
stringent three-part test.41 The Michigan Supreme Court reasoned that
32. See, e.g., House Speaker v. Governor, 495 N.W.2d 539.
33. Id. at 543 (Mich. 1993) (holding that a litigant must possess a "substantial
interest" in the outcome of the case in order to have standing to bring a suit).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. See Detroit Fire Fighters Ass'n v. Detroit, 537 N. W2d 436 (Mich. 1995).
38. Lee v. Macomb Co. Bd. of Comm'rs, 629 N.W.2d 900, 907-08 (Mich. 2001)
39. Id.
40. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 684 N.W.2d 800, 810-11
(Mich. 2004).
41. Susan J. Mahoney, Muddying the Waters: The Effects of the Cleveland Cliffs
Decision and the Future of the MEPA Citizen Suit, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 229, 233
(2006).
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the federal test for standing, as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Lujan, clearly set out the minimum constitutional requirements for
standing.42 Therefore, in order to have standing to bring a cause of
action in Michigan, the Lee court held that a claimant must be able to
1) injury in fact; 2) causation; and
demonstrate the following:
3) redressability).4 3 Thus, prior to the Lansing decision, the Michigan
Supreme Court employed a strict yet straightforward three pronged test
for standing.
III. ANALYSIS
A.

The LansingDecision

As noted above, the Lansing Court, in choosing to overrule Lee and
its progeny, elected to abandon the federal test for standing to sue in
Michigan.4 The Court held that the federal test for standing is not
appropriate because Michigan courts are not limited by a specific
The Court
constitutional "case" or "controversy" requirement.45
no sense
it
makes
requirement,
lacks
this
Michigan
reasoned that because
to restrict the jurisdiction of state courts in a manner similar to that of
federal courts.46
Moreover, the majority opined that the limits of federal judicial
power are not relevant whatsoever to determining the jurisdictional reach
of Michigan courts under the state's Constitution.4 ' The court noted that
state courts in Michigan already possess a broader set of powers than the
federal judiciary. 4 8 For example, the Michigan Supreme Court has the
power to issue advisory opinions, and the United States Supreme Court
does not possess a similar power.4 9 Therefore, the Lansing court held
that the Lee court and its progeny erred in determining that the Michigan
Constitution implicitly limited the judiciary's power to adjudicating a
"case" or "controversy."5 o Moreover, the Court reasoned that the
decision to adopt the federal test for standing was not consistent with
42. Cleveland Cliffs, 684 N.W.2d at 811.
43. Lee, 629 N.W.2d at 907-08 (adopting the Lujan test because it clearly articulates
the "fundamental" requirements for standing).
44. See Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 699
(Mich. 2010).
45. Id. at 696 (stating that in Lee, the Michigan Supreme Court improperly inferred
such a constitutional requirement from other constitutional provisions which mandated
the separation of powers).

46. Id.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 696-97.
Id. at 694-95.
Id.
Id. at 694-96.
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Michigan's historical jurisprudence.5 1 The Court noted that prior to the
adoption of the federal test, Michigan had employed a limited prudential
approach.52 Based on that observation, the Court held that in order to
adhere to its historical precedent, it was necessary to abandon the federal
test for standing and return to a set of prudential considerations.s3
Under the prudential test for standing articulated by the Lansing
court, a plaintiff has standing to bring a suit if either: 1) he or she has a
specific legal cause of action; or 2) the trial court, in its discretion,
believes the plaintiff to have standing for some other reason.54 In
determining whether a party has standing to sue, a trial court may look to
various factors, such as a special injury, right, or substantial interest.55
The court chose to adopt this test because it believed this new prudential
approach was consistent with public policy goals and with Michigan's
historical approach to standing.56 Additionally, the Michigan Supreme
Court reasoned that the definition of justiciable "cases" should not be
limited to situations in which a party suffered a concrete and
particularized injury caused directly by the challenged conduct.57 The
Court argued that to limit judicial power in such a way would unfairly
limit access to the court system.ss In other words, the new prudential
approach is designed to allow a greater amount of cases to survive a
standing analysis. 59
5 1. Id.
52. Id. at 691-92 (noting that Michigan had historically employed a more limited
prudential approach to standing which was aimed at ensuring "sincere and vigorous
advocacy"). Moreover, the court noted that unlike the federal Lujan/Lee test for standing,
Michigan's historical approach allowed a court to disregard standing if it was in the
interests ofjustice. Id.
53. Id. at 699. Contra Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792
N.W.2d 686, 724 (Mich. 2010) (Corrigan, J. dissenting) (stating that the majority's
argument ignores the fact the Michigan's earliest jurisprudence characterized the limits of
the state's judicial power in terms of the power to hear and decide "cases" or
"controversies").
54. See id. at 699.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id (stating that "A litigant may have standing in this context if the litigant
has a special injury or right, or substantial interest, that will be detrimentally affected in a
manner different from the citizenry at large or if the statutory scheme implies that the
Legislature intended to confer standing on the litigant.").
58. Id. at 698 (arguing that the Lee test for standing was contrary to the public
interest because it prevented litigants from pursuing certain types of claims, such as the
enforcement of a public right).
59. Id. (stating that the purpose of standing should be to ensure "sincere and
vigorous advocacy" and that the Lee/Cleveland Cliffs standing doctrine is, at the expense
of the public interest, "broader than this purpose because it may prevent litigants from
enforcing public rights, despite the presence of adverse interests and parties, and
regardless of whether the Legislature intended a private right of enforcement to be part of
the statute's enforcement scheme").
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Also, in Lansing, the court not only outlined a set of prudential
considerations for standing, but it also stated that the Legislature should
have the power to create standing by statute. 60 The court stated that if the
legislature elects to implement its statutory schemes in part by granting
citizens the ability to enforce public rights enumerated in those statutes,
then courts should respect that decision.61 Therefore, under Lansing, the
legislature has the power to statutorily expand the jurisdiction of courts
by conferring standing on a class of citizens.6 2
Thus, in abandoning the federal test for standing, the Michigan
Supreme Court moved away from a clear and straightforward standing
analysis in favor of a more permissive, yet vaguely defined, prudential
approach.6 3 This prudential approach not only provides courts with a
wide range of discretion in conducting a standing analysis, but it also
permits the legislature to confer standing to sue on individuals. 64 In sum,
the court reasoned that the strict three-part analysis promulgated by
federal courts is neither mandated by the Michigan Constitution nor is
consistent with the state's historically more prudential approach to the
doctrine.6 5
B.

Multi-JurisdictionalSurvey: Is the Lansing Decision an Outlier
Nationally?
1.

Michigan's New Standing Doctrine is Representative of a
Larger National Trend of Liberalizing Standing Requirements

The Lansing decision represents an emerging national trend of
liberalizing standing requirements and allowing for greater access to the
court system. Other state supreme courts have held that the federal test
for standing is not appropriate for their respective states.66 Many of these
courts, like the Michigan Supreme Court, have held that the federal test
for standing is not applicable because their state's constitutions lack an

60. Id. at 699.
61. Id. at 698 (concluding that the Lee test for standing was too restrictive because it
failed to consider "whether the Legislature intended a private right of enforcement to be
part of the statute's enforcement scheme").
62. Id. at 698-700.
63. Id. at 732-33 (Corrigan, J. dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion
abandons a simple straightforward test for standing in favor of a clumsy and confusing
test).
64. Id. at 699.
65. Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 693 (Mich.
2010) (stating that "[t]here is no support in either the text of the Michigan Constitution or
in Michigan jurisprudence, however, for recognizing standing as a constitutional
requirement or for adopting the federal standing doctrine").
66. See, e.g., Kellas v. Dep't of Corr., 145 P.3d 139 (Or. 2006).
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explicit "case" or "controversy" requirement.67 For example, in Kellas v.
6
8 the Oregon Supreme Court elected not to
Department of Corrections,
for reasons substantially similar to
standing
test
for
the
federal
adopt
those outlined by the Michigan Supreme Court. 69 The Court stated that
because the Oregon Constitution contains no explicit "cases or
controversies requirement," the court does not have to "import federal
law regarding justiciability into our analysis of the Oregon Constitution
and rely on it to fabricate constitutional barriers with no support in either
the text or history of Oregon's charter of government."70 In other words,
other state courts agree that federal law should have no bearing on
deciding what types of claims are justiciable under their respective state
constitutions. These states, like Michigan, have reasoned that, because
their respective state constitutions do not contain an explicit "case" or
"controversy" clause, there is not a valid reason to limit arbitrarily the
jurisdictional reach of their courts in a manner similar to that of the
federal government.n
Some of the states that have explicitly rejected the federal test for
standing have endorsed a prudential approach to standing similar to the
test outlined by the Michigan Supreme Court. For example, in Coalition
for Adequacy & Fairness in School Funding,Inc. v. Chiles,72 the Florida
Supreme Court elected to reject the federal test for standing and to
instead employ a prudential approach that was more consistent with
Florida's historical jurisprudence on the issue.73 Additionally, the
Oregon Supreme Court not only held that a prudential approach to
standing is warranted, but also held that an approach that recognizes the
authority of the legislature to confer standing on various classes of
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 142-43 (declining to adopt the Lujan test for standing because the Oregon
Constitution does not contain a "case" or "controversy" clause). Cf Lansing Sch. Educ.
Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 696 (Mich. 2010) (stating that because
Michigan has no explicit constitutional case or controversy requirement, its courts should
not be limited in the same manner as federal courts).
70. Id.
71. Id. See also Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680
So.2d 400, 403 (Fla. 1996) (stating that Florida courts do not rigidly follow the federal
requirements for standing); Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem. Hosp., 237 Ill. 2d. 217 (Ill. 2010)
(explaining that Illinois is not required to follow federal law on standing); Nefedro v.
Montgomery Co., 996 A.2d 850 (Md. 2010) (noting that the federal test for standing is
not applicable to state courts).
72. Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400,
403 (Fla. 1996).
73. Id. See also Kellas, 145 P.3d at 143 (outlining a prudential approach to standing
by stating that the judiciary should not embrace rigid tests for justiciability but should
rather focus on more flexible methods of statutory interpretations that "can be altered to
meet desired ends").
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individuals is consistent with the Oregon Constitution. 4 This type of
rationale is echoed by the Michigan Supreme Court throughout the
Lansing opinion. 75
Some other states, while not specifically rejecting the federal test
for standing, have nonetheless adopted a prudential test similar to the one
articulated by the Michigan Supreme Court.76 For example, some states
that have elected to employ a prudential approach allow a citizen to
challenge the validity of statutes without showing a distinct injury.77
Similarly, Lansing allows a person to bring a cause of action absent a
particularized injury, so long as the legislature has conferred standing
upon them.
2.

The Trend of Rejecting the Federal Test for Standing in Favor
of a Prudential Approach Represents a Minority View
Nationally

Despite the fact that some state courts have chosen not to adopt the
federal test for standing, the Michigan Supreme Court's decision to
abandon the federal test based on a lack of an explicit constitutional
"case" or "controversy" requirement appears to represent a minority
view nationally. First, as the dissent in Lansing notes, no state appears to
have an explicit "case" or "controversy" requirement in its constitution.7 9
However, despite this fact, a large number of states have chosen to adopt
the federal test for standing or a substantially similar test.80 These states
74. Kellas, 145 P.3d at 143.
75. See Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 699
(Mich. 2010) (outlining the prudential considerations a court should consider in
determining standing and also stating that the legislature has the power to statutorily
create standing).
76. See, e.g., Jen Electric, Inc. v. County of Essex, 197 N.J. 627, 645 (2009)
(employing a liberal prudential test for standing which allows courts to dispense with
rigid standing requirements in order to focus on the merits of a particular case).
77. See, e.g., Nefedro v. Montgomery County, 414 Md. 585, 592 (2010) (stating that
in "a multitude of cases, this Court has recognize[d] the availability of actions for
declaratory judgments or injunctions challenging the validity of statutes or regulations
which may, in the future, be applied to or adversely affect the plaintiffs").
78. Lansing, 792 N.W.2d at 699.
79. See id. at 389-90 (Corrigan, J. dissenting) (noting that "no state in the union
incorporates explicit 'case or controversy' language into its constitution, yet many states
explicitly employ the federal test-which is rooted in the traditional case or controversy
requirement-that we adopted in Lee").
80. See, e.g., Granite State Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Rosewell, 238 Ga.
417, 418 (2008) (stating that Lujan sets out the appropriate test for standing to sue in
Georgia). See also Dover Historical Society v. City of Dover Planning Comm., 838 A.2d
1103, 1111 (Del. 2003) (stating that the federal requirements for standing were the same
requirements necessary to bring a case or controversy in Delaware); Lansing Sch. Educ.
Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 735 n.32 (containing a footnote noting
that the following states have adopted the federal test for standing or a substantially
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often imply a case or controversy requirement from constitutional
provisions mandating the separation of powers.8 This concept that
courts can imply a "case" or "controversy" requirement is similar to what
Michigan had done prior to the Lansing decision. 82 Moreover, these
cases tend to agree that the federal test provides the best measure of the
minimum constitutional requirements for standing.8 3
In addition, Michigan is the only state to have adopted and then
subsequently abandoned the Federal test for standing. 84 The cases
discussed in the above section all relate to the initial issue of whether to
adopt the Lujan test. It remains to be seen whether other states, which
currently employ the federal test for standing, will follow Michigan's
lead and decide to abandon the Lujan test in favor of a more relaxed
approach to a standing inquiry.

similar test: Alabama; Alaska; Arizona; Connecticut; Georgia; Hawaii; Idaho; Iowa;
Mississippi; New Mexico; North Carolina; Ohio; Oklahoma; South Carolina; South
Dakota; Tennessee; Vermont; West Virginia; Wyoming; Illinois; Kansas; and Virginia).
81. See, e.g., Bennett v. Napolitano, 81 P.3d 311, 316 (Ariz. 2003) stating that:
Article VI of the Arizona Constitution, the judicial article, does not contain the
specific case or controversy requirement of the U.S. Constitution. But, unlike
the federal constitution in which the separation of powers principle is implicit,
our state constitution contains an express mandate, requiring that the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government be divided among the
three branches and exercised separately. This mandate underlies our own
requirement that as a matter of sound jurisprudence a litigant seeking relief in
the Arizona courts must first establish standing to sue).
John Does I through III v. Roman Catholic Church of the Archdioceses of Santa Fe, Inc.,
924 P.2d 273 (N.M. App. 1996) (holding that although New Mexico does not have an
explicit constitutional "case" or "controversy" requirement, the court could find "no
reason" to not apply the Federal test).
82. See Lee v. Macomb Co. Bd. of Comm'rs, 629 N.W.2d 900, 905-07 (Mich. 2001)
(stating that standing was constitutionally required in Michigan considering that the
constitution expressly mandates the separation of powers between the three branches of
government). See also Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d
686, 741 (Mich. 2010) (Corrigan, J. dissenting) (stating that the majority's decision to
overrule Lee and its progeny represents a complete rejection of the principle of stare
decisis and "should taste like bile in their mouths: like a bulimic after a three day bender,
the majority justices now purge a decade's worth" of important jurisprudence).
83. See, e.g., Sea Pines Ass'n for the Prot. of Wildlife, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Natural
Res., 550 S.E.2d 287, 291 (S.C. 2001) (quoting the Lujan test and stating that the United
States Supreme Court was correct in holding that the three Lujan factors constitute the
"irreducible constitutional minimum of standing").
84. See Lansing, 792 N.W.2d at 735 (Corrigan, J. dissenting) (pointing out that "no
state's highest court has adopted the federal standing test as its own only to decide, a few
short years later, to abandon the doctrine and return to a prior amorphous test that parties
and the courts found difficult to apply" and thus concluding that although the majority
opinion "repeatedly calls the test established by Lee 'unprecedented,' clearly it is the
majority's decision today-not Lee-that defies precedent").
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The PracticalConsequences of Michigan'sNew Standing Doctrine
1.

Judicial Confusion

The Lansing decision likely will lead to judicial confusion and
significant debate regarding the essential requirements needed to possess
standing to sue. Because a clear and predictable test no longer exists, it
seems probable that the new approach will cause some confusion over
the essential elements that a plaintiff must demonstrate in order to
establish standing.
As noted earlier, under Michigan's historical
prudential approach to standing, judicial confusion over the necessary
elements of standing was a recurring problem plaguing the court
system. 5 For example,85in Detroit FirefightersAssociation v. Detroit,86
the seven justices on the Michigan Supreme Court were unable to reach a
clear consensus on the necessary requirements for standing. 87 In this
case, the court failed to reach a clear majority, and consequently, the case
resulted in a split decision.88 The justices articulated a wide variety of
different approaches to a standing inquiry. For instance, some justices
focused on the necessity of an injury distinct from that of the general
public, while another engaged in a zone of injury analysis.8 Others
advocated for adopting the federal standard.90 It was this judicial
confusion, along with the inability of Michigan courts to articulate a
clear standing doctrine, which prompted the Michigan Supreme Court to
adopt the federal test in Lee.91
2.

A Greater Amount of Claims Will Be Able to Survive a
Standing Analysis

Michigan's new prudential standing doctrine likely will lead to a
greater number of cases where plaintiffs are able to establish standing.
85. See, e.g., Detroit Fire Fighters Ass'n v. Detroit, 537 N.W.2d 436 (Mich. 1995);
House Speaker v. Governor, 495 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Mich. 1993).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. See also Lansing, 792 N.W.2d at 731 (Corrigan, J. dissenting) (noting that
Detroit Firefightersresulted in "a split decision in which no majority could be found to
explain what elements were essential to standing in Michigan").
90. Id.
91. Lee v. Macomb Co. Bd. of Comm'rs, 629 N.W.2d 900, 907-08 (Mich. 2001)
(stating that "the Lujan test has the virtues of articulating clear criteria" for a standing
analysis); Lansing, 792 N.W.2d at 741 (Corrigan, J. dissenting) (noting that the "pre-Lee
status quo . . . was confusion and bitter division regarding rules that provided no clear
guidance regarding Michigan's constitutional standing requirements" and that "Lee
favored the commonly-accepted federal test which brought consistency to Michigan
courts in light of our lack of a clearly articulated, workable test").
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The Michigan Supreme Court designed the new prudential test to be less
restrictive, so it is only logical that a greater number of claims will
survive the pleading stage.92 Under this new prudential approach,
because a plaintiff is not required to show a specific injury or to meet any
other set of rigid requirements, it is conceivable that a plaintiff could
challenge a wide variety of previously unchallengeable governmental
actions. For instance, it is possible that a plaintiff could challenge a
legislative action or sue for the enforcement of a public right.93 A study
of other jurisdictions that employ a prudential approach to standing
supports the idea that plaintiffs in Michigan may now be able to sue for
the enforcement of a public right or to challenge administrative actions. 94
In other jurisdictions that utilize a prudential approach to standing, courts
have allowed plaintiffs to both challenge the constitutionality of statutes
and to sue for enforcement of other statutes without having to show any
type of special right or injury. 95
Moreover, a greater number of cases will survive a standing inquiry
because the Lansing court acknowledged that the Michigan Legislature
has the authority to statutorily create standing in certain classes of
individuals. 9 6 Under the previous test, the legislature could not confer
standing on anyone who otherwise would not satisfy all three elements of
the Lee test. 9 7 Courts had previously concluded that to allow the
legislature to statutorily create standing would infringe upon the
separation of powers because it would usurp the decision making power
of the executive branch. 98 The concern about a breakdown in the
92. Lansing, 792 N.W.2d at 697-98 (stating the previous test was too restrictive and
therefore contrary to public policy). The court also stated that the new test will allow a
citizen to sue to enforce a public right. Id
93. See id.
94. See id. at 708 (Corrigan, J. dissenting).
95. See, e.g., Coalition of for Adequacy & Fairness in School Funding, Inc. v.
Chiles, 680 So.2d. 400, 403 (Fla. 1996) (recognizing the ability of Florida residents to
file citizen taxpayer suits challenging legislative actions under the state's taxing and
spending clause).
96. Lansing, 792 N.W.2d at 697-98 (stating that the legislature may statutorily create
a private right of enforcement).
97. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992); Nat'l Wildlife
Fed'n v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 684 N.W.2d 800, 810 (Mich. 2004) (reasoning that
"[i]f the Legislature were permitted at its discretion to confer jurisdiction upon this Court
unmoored from any genuine case or controversy, this Court would be transformed in
character and empowered to decide matters that have historically been within the purview
of the Governor and the executive branch"); Lee v. Macomb County Board of Comm.,
629 N.W.2d 900, 906-08 (Mich. 2001).
98. See id. (stating that "[t]o permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public
interest in executive officers' compliance with the law into an 'individual right'
vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts
the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to 'take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed"').
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separation of powers arises from the idea that, if the legislature can
confer standing on citizens who otherwise could not satisfy the necessary
requirements to bring a cause of action, a citizen would be able to
challenge certain discretionary decisions made by executive agencies.99
In other words, the legislature now explicitly can confer a judicial right
of action upon an individual, thus expanding the types of claims a court
can adjudicate. Moreover, under Lansing, anyone who potentially stands
to benefit from the enforcement of a statute likely may sue under that
statute.'oo
Another type of claim that is likely to experience greater success
under Michigan's new approach to standing is a challenge to
environmental policy. Environmental claims had traditionally failed the
Lee test for standing because a claimant could not show a specific injury
distinct from that of the general public and because the global scope of
environmental problems made redress difficult.'0 ' However, the new
formula for standing does not expressly contain the same restrictions.102
Under the new doctrine, whether a plaintiff has a specific injury or right
of action is no longer an element of a strict standing test but is now a
mere factor to be considered under a prudential approach. In other
words, the question of whether a plaintiff can demonstrate a specific
injury or right is not necessarily outcome-determinative.1o3 Because a
party is technically no longer required to show a specific injury distinct
from that of the general public, it is possible that a greater amount of
environmental claims will survive a standing analysis. This new test
allows plaintiffs to assert injuries merely to a specific interest, such as an

99. Id.
100. Lansing, 792 N.W.2d at 697-98 (stating that teachers had standing to sue for the
enforcement of a statute that was designed to protect them). See also id. at 716
(Corrigan, J. dissenting) (stating that the majority effectively held that "every person
mentioned" in a statute now has standing to challenge discretionary decisions made by
the government under that statute and that this holding has the effect of "opening the
floodgates for-and overwhelming the courts with-collateral litigation whenever one
such person is dissatisfied").
101. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (stating that
a plaintiff had failed to assert an injury in fact because a concern over the increased rate
of extinction of a species was not an injury to the plaintiff and therefore plaintiff did not
have standing to bring his case). See also Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron
Co., 684 N.W.2d 800 (Mich. 2004).
102. See Lansing, 792 N.W.2d at 699 (holding that a plaintiff now has standing to sue
either if he 1) has a specific legal cause of action; or 2) if a trial court, in its discretion,
believes a litigant should have standing).
103. Id. (stating that, in a discretionary context, "[a] litigant may have standing ... if
the litigant has a special injury or right, or substantial interest, that will be detrimentally
affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large or if the statutory scheme
implies that the Legislature intended to confer standing on the litigant").
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interest in conservation or preserving the environment. 10 4 Accordingly, a
plaintiff may now be able to bring suit for the enforcement of statutory
environmental policies or for an agency's failure to enforce those
policies and these types of claims will experience greater success in part
because a plaintiff does not have to demonstrate an injury distinct from
that of the general public.105 Thus, Michigan courts will likely adjudicate
a much greater number of cases that involve a challenge to
environmental policy decisions.
This outcome seems even more likely considering the fact that the
legislature once again has the power to confer standing on certain classes
of individuals.1 0 6 Prior to the Michigan Supreme Court's adoption of the
Federal test for standing in Lee, the Michigan Environmental Protection
Act (MEPA) had been recognized as a legislative grant of standing to
any citizen who wishes to bring a suit against a party whose actions have
or may have adversely affected the environment. 0 7 Michigan courts had
historically permitted citizens to bring environmental challenges under
MEPA.10 However, after the adoption of the federal test for standing in
Lee, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a citizen could not bring this
type of claim.109 The court reasoned that the Legislature could not
statutorily create standing in a class of citizens who otherwise would not
satisfy the Lujan test. 10 As noted above, under the new approach, the
Court now recognizes the ability of the Legislature to create standing
statutorily."' Therefore, it seems likely that citizens will be able to sue
for the enforcement of any statutory provision that provides them with a
specific benefit or right of action, including the Michigan Environmental

Protection Act."12
104. Id. at 700 (holding that even though the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a
specific injury or a specific cause of action conferred on them by the legislature, the
teachers union had standing to sue because it was able to demonstrate that it had a
"substantial interest" in the enforcement of the statute).
105. See cases cited supra notes 92-94.
106. Lansing, 792 N.W.2d at 698-99.
107. MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52.
108. See, e.g., Nemeth v. Abonmarche Dev., Inc., 576 N.W.2d 641 (Mich. 1998);
Trout Unlimited Muskegon White River Chapter v. City of White Cloud, 489 N.W.2d
188 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Eyde v. State, 225 N.W.2d I (Mich. 1975).
109. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 684 N.W.2d 800 (Mich. 2004).
110. Id.
111. Lansing, 792 N.W.2d at 698-99.
112. In other states that employ a prudential approach to standing, courts have
allowed a claimant to challenge the validity of administrative decisions under applicable
statutes. See, e.g., Kellas v. Dep't of Corr., 145 P.3d 139, 142 (Or. 2006) (stating that, in
Oregon, it is clear that the "legislature intends by the statute to authorize any person to
invoke the judicial power of the court to test the validity of every administrative rule
under existing statutory and constitutional law and, thus, to advance the objective that all
agency rulemaking shall remain within applicable procedural and substantive legal
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The argument that the Lansing decision paves the way for citizens,
who could not otherwise display an injury distinct from that of the
general public, to challenge governmental actions related to
environmental policy, is strengthened by a recent post-Lansing decision
issued by the Michigan Supreme Court. In Anglers of the AuSable, Inc.
v. Department of Environmental Quality, 3 the court held that the
Michigan Department of Natural Resources and Environment (DNRE)
now may be sued under MEPA for the issuing of a permit.11 4 The court
went so far as to hold that a citizen may challenge the DNRE's decision
to issue a permit in court, even if the permit was already challenged
under the appropriate administrative procedures.' 15 The court stated that
the Lansing case clearly established the principal that because statutes
must be applied as written, the legislature has the power to statutorily
create standing for a class of citizens in a variety of actions, including
environmental challenges." 6 Accordingly, the court reasoned that
because MEPA specifies that "any person may maintain an action ...
against any person for the protection of the air, water, and other natural
resources and the public trust in these resources from pollution,
impairment, or destruction,"'' 7 it is clear that under the statute "any
person has standing to maintain an action protecting Michigan's natural
resources."" 8 The court went on to conclude that a citizen satisfied the
prudential "substantial interest" test for standing articulated in Lansing
because the Michigan Legislature, by passing MEPA, evidenced a clear
intent to protect the environment.' 19 The court expressed the view that
"the [issuance of a] permit from the [Department of Environmental
Quality] serves as the trigger for the environmental harm to occur"
because the "permit process is entirely related to the environmental harm
that flows from an improvidently granted, or unlawful, permit."l2 Thus,
it seems clear that the Lansing decision has paved the way for citizen
suits challenging environmental policy decisions in Michigan.
In sum, the Lansing court, by adopting an imprecise test for
standing based on loose prudential considerations, has inadvertently
increased the amount of cases that will be able to survive a standing

bounds").
113. Anglers of the AuSable, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 793 N.W.2d 596 (Mich.
2010).
114. Id. at 601-604.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 602-604.
117. MCL 324.1701(1) (2011).
118. Anglers, 793 N.W.2d at 603.
119. Id at 601-02.
120. Id. at 601.
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inquiry in Michigan. 1 2' The language of the court's decision fails to
outline a clear test for standing and instead leaves much of the analysis
up to the individual discretion of trial courts.122 Moreover, because the
new test for standing both does not require a claimant to demonstrate an
individualized injury and recognizes the ability of the legislature to
arbitrarily create standing; seemingly any person can now sue for
enforcement of a public right or subject a good faith discretionary
decision made by a government agency to judicial review. 123 For
example, as noted above, in the wake of the Lansing decision, Michigan
citizens now have standing to challenge discretionary environmental
policy decisions made by government agencies without having to
demonstrate any particularized injury or special right.12 4 Therefore, the
Lansing decision is extremely problematic because it opens the
courthouse doors to an unprecedented wave of litigation.
3.

Separation of Powers

The Lansing decision could potentially lead to separation of powers
issues because it does not restrain the jurisdictional reach of courts to
adjudicating only a "case" or "controversy." 25 The United States
Supreme Court has held that, while there may be some prudential aspects
to standing, the core component of the doctrine is a "case" or
"controversy" requirement.126 Courts have held that this requirement is
essential to maintaining the separation of powers. 12 7 The basic concern is
that if a plaintiff no longer needs to satisfy the essential elements of a
case or controversy,128 courts constantly would be asked to review
decisions made by the other branches of government.1 2 9
121. See Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 734
(Mich. 2010) (Corrigan, J. dissenting).
122. See id.
123. See cases cited supra notes 84-86, 95-96, 100-105 and accompanying text.
124. See cases cited supra notes 100-108 and accompanying text.
125. See Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 699
(Mich. 2010).
126. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 558 (1992).
127. See id. (reasoning that limiting judicial power to cases or controversies is
necessary to preserve the separation of powers). See also Allen v Wright, 468 U.S. 737;
104 S. Ct. 3315; 82 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1984) (stating that "standing is built on a single basic
idea-the idea of separation of powers").
128. Injury, causation, and redressability are the basic elements of a controversy. See
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
129. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S., 343, 349 (1996) (stating that the doctrine of standing
is "a constitutional principle that prevents courts of law from undertaking tasks assigned
to other branches"). See also Lee v. Macomb Co. Bd. of Comm'rs, 629 N.W.2d 900, 905
(Mich. 2001) (stating that in Michigan, "standing is of great consequence so that neglect
of it would imperil the constitutional architecture whereby governmental powers are
divided between the three branches of government").
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The new prudential test for standing promulgated by the Michigan
Supreme Court could lead to separation of powers issues because it does
not specifically require a plaintiff to show any type of particularized
injury or special right to enforcement in order bring a suit. 30 Without
the requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate a particularized injury, there
is no mechanism for establishing a firm limit on the types of claims a
court can adjudicate.' 31 For example, if a citizen does not support a law
passed by the legislature, he or she theoretically could challenge the law
in court without having to show that the law negatively affects him or her
in a specific way.1 3 2 Allowing this type of lawsuit weakens the
constitutionally mandated separation of powers because it permits a
citizen to circumvent the legislative process by forcing courts to decide
Applying the same
political issues better left to the legislature.
rationale, if a citizen merely believes a governmental agency is
improperly enforcing a statute, the citizen can conceivably sue for
injunctive relief.134 Indeed, in other jurisdictions employing a prudential
approach, courts have allowed a citizen to challenge the application of

130. See Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 708
(Mich. 2010) (Corrigan, J. dissenting) (arguing that the standing analysis adopted by the
majority "violates the constitutional separation of powers mandate and gives courts
unbounded discretion to overturn the decisions of other branches of government").
131. See id. at 708-09 (arguing that the majority decision "opens the courthouse
doors" because it "eliminates our workable, principled standing test" and, by articulating
a loosely defined prudential approach to standing, "adopts no meaningful limitations for a
binding doctrine that applies in every civil lawsuit brought in this state").
132. See NatI Wildlife Fed'n v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 684 N.W.2d 800, 806-07
(Mich. 2004) (arguing that, absent the requirement of a particularized injury, "[i]f a
taxpayer, for example, opposed the closing of a tax "loophole" by the Legislature, the
legislation might be challenged in court. If a taxpayer opposed an expenditure for a
public building, that, too, might be challenged in court. If a citizen disagreed with the
manner in which agriculture officials were administering farm programs, or
transportation officials' highway programs, or social services officials' welfare programs,
those might all be challenged in court. If a citizen opposed new prison disciplinary
policies, that might be challenged in court . . . in each instance, the result would be to
have the judicial branch of government . . . deciding public policy, not in response to a
real dispute in which a plaintiff had suffered a distinct and personal harm, but in response
to a lawsuit from a citizen who had simply not prevailed in the representative processes
of government.").

133. See Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc., 737
N.W.2d 447, 453 (Mich. 2007) (stating that without a strict standing doctrine "[t]he
purposely drawn boundaries within our tripartite government would vanish, removing the
impediments that were intended to prevent one branch of government from exercising
powers exclusively vested in the other, coequal branches").
134. See Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 708
(Mich. 2010) (Corrigan, J. dissenting) (stating that "the majority jettisons years of
binding precedent on the basis of four justices' current estimation that the public would
be better served by opening the courts to all manner of challenges to acts of the
legislative and executive branches").
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statutory policy by a governmental agency."'
Permitting these types of claims to survive a standing inquiry is
extremely problematic from a separation of powers perspective because
it effectively forces the court system to oversee and reevaluate everyday
decisions made by the legislative and executive branches of
government.13 6 The United States Supreme court echoed this sentiment
when it stated that to allow standing without requiring a particularized
injury would ask courts "not to decide judicial controversy, but to
assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and
co-equal department, an authority which [courts] plainly do not
possess." 3 7 The judicial branch, the least politically accountable branch,
will be asked to review decisions made by the other branches of
government. To put it differently, courts now may be asked to decide
political questions which were traditionally decided by the other
branches of government.13 8 This outcome would misconstrue the
constitutional function of the judiciary by allowing parties whose efforts
were unsuccessful in either the legislative or executive processes to
obtain judicial relief.139 In addition, allowing this type of cause of action
effectively creates an unequal distribution of power between the three
branches of government by providing for judicial oversight of the other
Therefore, the Lansing decision could impede the
branches.14 0
separation of powers by granting courts the ability to decide suits that
would fall outside the traditional definition of a "case" or "controversy."
IV. CONCLUSION

Standing to sue in Michigan first developed out of a belief that
courts should only adjudicate a "case" or "controversy."'41 Courts
reasoned that it was necessary to limit their jurisdictional reach in this
135. See, e.g., Kellas v. Dep't of Corr., 145 P.3d 139, 145 (Or. 2006) (stating that the
Oregon Supreme Court has "implicitly recognized that the Oregon Constitution does not
limit the legislature's power to deputize its citizens to challenge government action in the
public interest" and that "[i]n fact ... this court [has] held [a] case to be justiciable even
though its decision would have a practical effect only on the respondent . . . and not on
the petitioner").
136. Nestle, 737 N.W.2d at 453. See also Lansing, 792 N.W.2d at 710 (Corrigan, J.
dissenting) (claiming that the test for standing articulated in majority opinion gives
"courts carte blanche to invade" the province of government agencies).
137. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487-89 (1923).
138. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 684 N.W.2d 800, 806 (Mich.
2004) (stating that "absent a particularized injury, there would be little that would be
standing in the way of the judicial branch becoming intertwined in every matter of public
debate").
139. Id. at 806-07.
140. Id. See also Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487-89 (1923).
141. See cases cited supranote 18.
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manner in order to insure the legitimacy of claims and to protect the
division of powers among the various branches of government.' 4 2
Historically, Michigan courts had some difficulty defining the necessary
requirements for standing to sue and thus, the doctrine was the subject of
much debate for the better part of the twentieth century.14 3 However, in
Lee, the Michigan Supreme Court finally settled on a clear test for
standing and imported the Lujan test to Michigan.144 The court
essentially believed that various state constitutional provisions created an
implied "case" or "controversy" requirement, which necessitated limiting
the jurisdiction of Michigan courts in a manner akin to that of federal
courts.145
The Michigan Supreme Court's decision in Lansing represents the
liberalization of the standing doctrine in Michigan. In Lansing, the court
dramatically departed from the court's established standing jurisprudence
and chose to abandon the strict federal test for standing in favor of
applying a loose approach built upon vague prudential considerations.14 6
This Comment, through a multi-jurisdictional analysis of standing
jurisprudence, demonstrated that the decision by the Lansing court to
abandon the federal test for standing in Michigan represents a minority
approach nationally. It appears that virtually no state has an explicit
"case" or "controversy" requirement, and yet a large number of states
have nonetheless chosen to adopt the federal test.14 7 These courts imply
a state constitutional "case" or "controversy" limitation in a manner
similar to that which had been previously articulated in Michigan.148
The practical consequences of the Lansing decision suggest that it
could have a negative impact on the Michigan court system. The
Michigan Supreme Court needlessly abandoned a clear standard for
determining standing and instead promulgated a vague and seemingly
incomprehensible test.14 9 The court's new abstract approach to standing

142.

See supra notes 19-23.

143. See, e.g., Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686,
735 (Mich. 2010) (Corrigan, J. dissenting) (noting that Michigan's standing jurisprudence
was historically marked by judicial confusion and debate).
144. Lee v. Macomb Co. Bd. Of Comm'rs, 629 N.W.2d 900, 907-08 (Mich. 2001).
145. Id.
146. See Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 699
(Mich. 2010).
147. See cases cited supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Bennett v. Napolitano, 81 P.3d 311, 316 (Ariz. 2003) (stating that a
judicial "case" or "controversy" requirement is implicitly required based on state
constitutional provisions mandating the separation of powers). Cf Lee, 629 N.W.2d 900
at 905-06 (reasoning that, in Michigan, there is an implicit "case" or "controversy"
limitation on the judiciary because the constitution contains provisions which provide for
the separation of powers).
149. See Lansing, 792 N.W.2d at 735 (Mich. 2010) (Corrigan, J. dissenting) (noting
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may also lead to judicial confusion, 5 o an unprecedented rise in
litigation, 151 and a breakdown of the constitutionally mandated separation

of powers.

15 2

First, this Comment has demonstrated that the new prudential
approach to standing is likely to generate a great amount of judicial
debate and confusion over the necessary requirements for standing
because the Michigan Supreme Court failed to articulate a coherent
Michigan's historical jurisprudence supports this
approach. 15 3
conclusion as previous attempts at a prudential approach to standing
were characterized by intense periods of debate and judicial confusion. 154
Second, because the Lansing test is considerably more permissive
than the previous test, a much wider variety of suits could be able to
survive a standing analysis. 155 The number of successful claims may
increase because the standard adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court
does not necessarily require a plaintiff to demonstrate a particularized
injury and also because it permits a citizen to sue for the enforcement of
a public right.156 Therefore, seemingly any action taken by a government
agency, such as a discretionary decision related to an environmental
protection statute, is potentially subject to judicial review. 5 7
Lastly, the Lansing decision could infringe upon a fundamental
principle of American government, the separation of powers, by forcing
the judiciary to invade the provinces of the other branches
government.15 8 The judiciary, because its jurisdictional reach is no
longer limited by a "case" or "controversy" requirement, may be asked
to evaluate a wide range of discretionary policy decisions made by both
Thus, by abandoning the
the executive and the legislature. 5 9
that the new test for standing is very broad and confusing).
150. See suprapp. 26-27.
151. See suprapp. 27-37.
152. See suprapp. 23-42.
153. See cases cited supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
154. See Lansing, 792 N.W.2d at 735 (Mich. 2010) (Corrigan, J. dissenting) (stating
that "[i]nexplicably, the majority apparently celebrates that, prior to Lee, Michigan's
standing doctrine suffered from inconsistent application, and in some cases, was not
analyzed or applied at all" and concluding that "[u]nfortunately, the majority's test can
promise no better in the future; this is particularly true since, by its explicit terms,
standing can now be determined at the "discretion" of trial courts.").
155. See cases cited supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
156. See supra pp. 27-36.
157. See, e.g., Anglers of the AuSable, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, No. 138863,
2010 Mich. LEXIS 2591 (Mich. Dec. 29, 2010) (allowing a citizen to sue the Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality for a discretionary decision).
158. See supra pp. 37-42.
159. See Lansing, 792 N.W.2d at 735 (Mich. 2010) (Corrigan, J. dissenting)
(concluding that "[u]ltimately, the majority's decision today redounds only to the benefit
of those who wish to use the courts--the least politically accountable branch of
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straightforward requirements of the Lee test in favor of a somewhat
clumsily articulated prudential approach, the Michigan Supreme Court
may have inadvertently opened the courts up to wave of problematic
litigation. 16o
As a final note, the long term reach of the Lansing decision seems
unclear in the wake of a recent political shake-up on the Michigan
Supreme Court.' 6 1 In the most recent judicial elections, the political
balance on the Michigan Supreme Court shifted as the conservative
jurists took back a majority of the court.162 The dissenting justices of the
Lansing decision are now among the judicial majority. Only time will
tell if this new majority will seek to overturn the litigation friendly test
for standing that the Michigan Supreme Court created when it decided
Lansing.

government-to legislate and regulate increasingly larger spheres of Michigan life and
politics").
160. See id. at 745 (concluding that "the result [of the Lansing decision] boils down to
this: in this state, anyone has standing to sue anyone else, any time").
161. See, e.g., Update: Michigan Supreme Court Picks Robert Young Jr. as Chief
Justice,
MLIVE.COM,
http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/01/michigan
supreme-court to meet.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2011).
162. See id. (noting that conservatives justices have reclaimed a majority on the
court).
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